In the weeks following April 26, 2010, en banc decision of a deeply divided Ninth Circuit in Dukes v Wal-Mart Stores.pdf, 603 F.3d 571 (9th Cir. 2010), plaintiffs have predictably argued that the opinion justifies the certification of classes of virtually any size, including those in the overtime/misclassification arena. The case, however, does not apply to such claims by its own terms.

The Dukes case involved a pattern and practice claim under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e et seq., for gender discrimination in pay and promotions. The plaintiffs’ claims were bolstered by statistical evidence allegedly showing that while two thirds of the hourly Wal-Mart associates were women, only one third of managers were female, and by similar evidence that pay disparities existed in some stores as well as expert and anecdotal evidence regarding discriminatory conduct. The plaintiffs also made a showing, the court found, that Wal-Mart had a uniform personnel and management structure throughout its stores (a factor frequently absent in overtime cases), extensive centralized corporate control over its stores (ditto), and gender disparities in every domestic region of the company. Id. at 600. Relying heavily on the “abuse of discretion” standard of review, a bare majority of the court upheld the district court’s decision to certify the class.

The Dukes decision, however, contains nothing suggesting that large overtime classes should be certified. First, of course, the Ninth Circuit was reviewing the certification decision under an abuse of discretion standard, and even under that lenient benchmark fully five of the eleven judges believed it to be erroneous. The opinion thus is far from a ringing endorsement of the decision to certify, and nothing in the majority or dissents suggests that certification would have survived a less lenient review.

Second, the claim at issue in Dukes bore no relationship to overtime claims. Indeed, the majority took care to emphasize that the plaintiffs’ claims were those for an alleged pattern and practice of gender discrimination under Title VII, claims that by definition required no individual inquiry. Id. at 619, n. 41. It chided the dissent for what it described as a “misguided” concern for individual inquiries in that context. Id.

There is, of course, no such thing as a “pattern and practice” claim under the Fair Labor Standards Act or under any state overtime law that we are aware of, and particularly in misclassification cases both state and federal courts have emphasized the need for an individual inquiry regarding the duties of the putative class members. Thus, the text of the Dukes opinion reflects that the case was decided under a statute under which the individualized inquiry mandated in the overtime context was irrelevant. Further, nothing in Dukes suggests any misgivings about its prior holdings in the Wells Fargo.pdf and Vinole.pdf cases, in which the court rejected the certification of overtime classes far smaller than the class alleged in Dukes.

The Bottom Line: The Dukes case does stand for the proposition that a district court in the Ninth Circuit may not abuse its discretion by certifying a large uniform class in a Title VII pattern and practice case in the face of strong statistical evidence of gender discrimination . However, it sheds no light on whether a court should certify an overtime class of individuals working in a range of functions across different facilities when, by law, an individualized inquiry is required.